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Abstract
In cooperative stochastic games multiple agents
work towards learning joint optimal actions in an
unknown environment to achieve a common goal.
In many real-world applications, however, con-
straints are often imposed on the actions that can
be jointly taken by the agents. In such scenarios
the agents aim to learn joint actions to achieve a
common goal (minimizing a specified cost func-
tion) while meeting the given constraints (specified
via certain penalty functions). In this paper, we
consider the relaxation of the constrained optimiza-
tion problem by constructing the Lagrangian of the
cost and penalty functions. We propose a nested
actor-critic solution approach to solve this relaxed
problem. In this approach, an actor-critic scheme
is employed to improve the policy for a given La-
grange parameter update on a faster timescale as in
the classical actor-critic architecture. A meta actor-
critic scheme using this faster timescale policy up-
dates is then employed to improve the Lagrange pa-
rameters on the slower timescale. Utilizing the pro-
posed nested actor-critic schemes, we develop three
Nested Actor-Critic (N-AC) algorithms. Through
experiments on constrained cooperative tasks, we
show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms.
1 Introduction
In the reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm, an agent inter-
acts with its environment by selecting actions in a trial and
error manner. The agent incurs cost for the chosen actions
and the goal of the agent is to learn to choose actions to min-
imize a long-run cost objective. The evolution of the state of
the environment and the cost feedback signal received by the
agent is modeled using the standard Markov Decision Process
(MDP) [Sutton and Barto, 1998] framework. Utilizing one of
the RL methods like Q-learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998],
the agent learns to choose optimal state dependent actions
(policy) by suitably balancing exploration of unexplored ac-
tions and exploiting the actions that incur low long-run costs.
However, in many problems of practical interest the number
of environment states and the set of actions that the agent
has to explore for learning the optimal actions are typically
high resulting in the phenomenon ‘curse of dimensionality’.
In such high-dimensional scenarios, RL methods in conjunc-
tion with deep neural networks as function approximators
known as “critic-only” or “actor-critic” methods have re-
sulted in successful practical applications [Mnih et al., 2015;
Levine et al., 2016].
Many real world problems nonetheless cannot be consid-
ered in the context of single agent RL and has led to the study
of multi-agent RL framework [Busoniu et al., 2008]. It is
important to observe that developing learning methods in the
multi-agent setting poses a serious challenge compared to the
single agent setting due to the exponential growth in state and
action spaces as the number of agents increase.
Multi-agent reinforcement learning problems have been
posed and studied in the mathematical framework of
“stochastic games” [Lauer and Riedmiller, 2000]. The
stochastic game setting could be categorized as (a) fully
cooperative [Littman, 2001; Lauer and Riedmiller, 2000;
Foerster et al., 2017a], (b) fully competitive [Littman, 1994]
and (c) mixed settings [Lowe et al., 2017; Foerster et al.,
2018]. In a fully cooperative game, agents coordinate with
other agents either through explicit communication [Das et
al., 2017; Foerster et al., 2016; Mordatch and Abbeel, 2017]
or through their actions to achieve a common goal. In this
paper, we consider the fully cooperative setting which has
gained popularity in recent times [Foerster et al., 2017b;
Gupta et al., 2017].
In many real-life multi-agent applications one often en-
counters constraints specified on the sequence of actions
taken by the agents. Under this setting, the combined goal
of the agents is to obtain the optimal joint action sequence
or policy that minimizes a long-run objective function while
meeting the constraints that are typically specified as long-
run penalty/budget functional constraints. It is important to
observe that both the objective as well as the penalty func-
tions depend on the joint policy of the agents. These prob-
lems are studied as “Constrained Markov Decision Process”
(C-MDP) [Altman, 1999] for the single agent RL setting and
as a “Constrained Stochastic Game (C-SG)” for the multi-
agent RL settings.
In this work, our goal is to develop multi-agent RL al-
gorithms for the setting of constrained cooperative stochas-
tic games. To this end, we utilize the Lagrange formulation
and propose novel actor-critic algorithms. Our algorithms,
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in addition to the classical actor-critic setup, utilize an addi-
tional meta actor-critic architecture to enforce constraints on
the agents. The meta actor performs gradient ascent on the
Lagrange parameters by obtaining the gradient information
from the meta critic. We propose three RL algorithms namely
JAL N-AC, Independent N-AC and Centralized N-AC by ex-
tending three popular algorithms of the unconstrained coop-
erative SGs to the constrained fully cooperative SGs. We now
summarize our contributions:
• We propose, for the first time, multi-agent actor-critic al-
gorithms for the constrained fully cooperative stochastic
game setting.
• Our algorithms do not require model information to be
known and utilize non-linear function approximation in
the actor as well as critic for modeling the policy as well
as value function.
• We utilize a meta actor-critic architecture in addition
to the classical actor-critic setup to satisfy the specified
constraints.
• The meta critic utilizes a non-linear function approxima-
tor for obtaining the value function of the penalty costs.
• Under this setup, we develop three RL algorithms for the
constrained multi-agent setting.
• We provide empirical evaluation of the performance of
our algorithms on certain constrained multi-agent tasks.
1.1 Related Work
The long-run average cost as the objective function with
long-run average cost constraints for the single agent MDP
setting has been considered in [Borkar, 2005] and a two-
time scale actor-critic scheme utilizing full state represen-
tation without function approximation has been developed
under this C-MDP setting. In [Lakshmanan and Bhatnagar,
2012] and [Bhatnagar, 2010; Bhatnagar and Lakshmanan,
2012] a constrained Q-learning algorithm as well as actor-
critic algorithms, respectively, utilizing linear function ap-
proximators have been proposed. Recently deep neural net-
work based value function approximators for C-MDPs under
the discounted cost objective setting have been presented in
[Achiam et al., 2017] and a constrained policy optimization
(CPO) algorithm has been developed for the continuous C-
MDPs for near constraint satisfaction.
2 Model
We first consider the problem of obtaining joint optimal ac-
tion sequence in the cooperative multi-agent setting. This
problem can be formulated in the framework of stochastic
games. A stochastic game is an extension of the single agent
Markov Decision Process to multiple agents. A stochas-
tic game is described by the tuple (n, S,A1, ...An, T, C, γ)
where n denotes the number of agents participating in the
game, S denotes the state space of the game,Ai, i ∈ 1, . . . , n
denotes the action space of the agents, C : S × A1 ×
... × An × S −→ R denotes the common cost function for
the cost incurred by the agents when the joint action pro-
file is (a1, a2, . . . , an), ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ {1, 2 . . . , n}, T :
S × A1 × ... × An × S −→ [0, 1] denotes the probability
transition mechanism where T (i, a1, . . . , an, j) specifies the
probability of transitioning to state j from the current state
i under the joint action profile (a1, ...an) of the agents and
γ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor.
Let Xt ∈ S denote the state of the game at time t. Assume
that the initial state X0 is sampled from an initial distribution
D. Let pii : S × A −→ [0, 1] be the stochastic policy followed
by the agent i. Here pii(a|s) for agent i specifies the probabil-
ity of choosing action a ∈ Ai in state s. Given a joint policy
of the agents pi = (pi1, . . . pin), we define the total discounted
cost incurred for the joint policy as
J(pi) = E
[ τ−1∑
t=0
γtC(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1)
]
, (1)
whereE[·] denotes the expectation taken over the sequence of
states under the joint policy pi, τ denotes the number of time
steps until the terminal state is reached in the game (random
but finite integer).
The objective of the agents in the cooperative stochastic
game is to learn a joint optimal policy pi∗ = (pi∗1 , . . . , pi
∗
n)
that minimizes (1), i.e.,
pi∗ = arg min
pi
J(pi). (2)
In the constrained cooperative stochastic game setting, we
considerK common total discounted penalty constraints with
single stage cost functions Pj : S × A1 × ... × An × S −→
R, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. These constraints are specified as
E
[ τ−1∑
t=0
γtPj(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1)
]
≤ αj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
(3)
where αj ≥ 0, j ∈ 1, . . .K are certain prescribed thresholds.
Under this constrained stochastic game setting, the objective
of the agents is to learn a joint policy pi that minimizes (1)
under constraints (3).
In order to solve for pi∗ in (2) subject to the constraints
(3), we consider the Lagrangian formulation of the multi-
agent constrained setting [Borkar, 2005; Bhatnagar, 2010].
Let λj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,K} denote the Lagrange multipliers for
each of these constraints. Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λK) denote the
vector of Lagrange multipliers. We define the Lagrangian
cost function as follows:
L(pi, λ) = E
[ τ−1∑
t=0
γt
(
C(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1) + (4)
K∑
i=1
λjPj(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1)
)]− K∑
j=1
λjαj .
Let g : RK −→ R denote the dual objective of the constrained
problem that is defined as
g(λ) = inf
pi
L(pi, λ). (5)
For a given vector of Lagrange multipliers, g(λ) can be com-
puted by optimally solving the unconstrained MDP with the
modified single stage cost function C˜ given by
C˜(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1) = C(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1)+
K∑
j=1
λjPj(Xt, pi(Xt), Xt+1). (6)
Let q : RK −→ Π denote the optimal policy obtained by
solving the unconstrained problem with the modified cost
function (6), i.e.,
q(λ) = arg min
pi∈Π
L(pi, λ), (7)
where Π denotes the space of all joint randomized policies.
After constructing the dual of the constrained problem, the
goal then is to maximize g(λ) with respect to Lagrange mul-
tipliers λ. Let λ∗ denote the optimal Lagrange multipliers
obtained by maximizing g(λ), i.e.,
λ∗ = arg max
λ≥0
g(λ). (8)
The optimal Lagrange multipliers λ∗ can be obtained by per-
forming gradient ascent on the function g(λ), i.e.,
λt+1 = (λt + b(t)∇g(λ))+, (9)
where b(t), t ≥ 0 is a suitably chosen step-size schedule and
(·)+ denotes the function max(·, 0). The gradient of g(λ)
with respect to the Lagrange multipliers λj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
can be obtained using the envelope theorem of mathematical
economics as follows (see [Borkar, 2005]):
∂g(λ)
∂λj
=
∂L(pi, λ)
∂λj
∣∣∣∣
pi=q(λ)
, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
= E
[ τ−1∑
t=0
γtPj(Xt, q(λ)(Xt), Xt+1)
]
− αj . (10)
Equation (10) indicates that the partial derivative with re-
spect to the Lagrange multipliers λj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
can be computed by performing policy evaluations of the
policy q(λt) corresponding to single-stage cost functions
Pj(Xt, q(λt)(Xt), Xt+1). The policy q(λ∗) corresponding
to the λ∗ at the end of the gradient iterations provides a near-
optimal policy satisfying (3), i.e.,
pi∗ = q(λ∗). (11)
To accomplish the task of computing gradients by policy
evaluation (10) and improving Lagrange multipliers (9), we
propose nested actor-critic architectures as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. In this setup, the inner (policy) actor-critic computes
the optimal policy that minimizes (4) (utilizing (6)) for a fixed
set of Lagrange multipliers λ. The policy obtained from the
inner actor-critic is given as input to the outer (penalty) critic.
The penalty critic then computes the gradient with respect to
Lagrangian by evaluating the policy q(λ) for all the penalty
functions as in (10). The gradient information is then pro-
vided to the outer (penalty) actor to improve the Lagrange
multipliers by performing gradient ascent as in (9). Finally,
the outer actor provides the improved Lagrange multipliers to
the policy actor-critic for obtaining the optimal policy at the
improved Lagrange multipliers.
Policy Critic
(Estimates the value
function for the
modified cost MDP)
Policy Actor
(Improves the policy)
Penalty Critic
(Estimates the value
function of penalty
cost for the policy q(λ)
Penalty Actor
(Improves La-
grange multipliers) ∇g(λ)
λ
q(λ)
Figure 1: Nested Actor-Critic (N-AC) architecture
3 Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we propose three multi-agent deep reinforce-
ment learning algorithms in the constrained setting. First, we
propose the Joint Action Learners (JAL) scheme for the con-
strained case and refer to this algorithm as “JAL N-AC”. This
algorithm employs centralized critics and a centralized actors.
As the number of agents that participate in the game increase,
the learning becomes slow due to action explosion. Next, to
mitigate the action explosion of JAL N-AC, we propose inde-
pendent learners scheme for the constrained setting and refer
to this algorithm as “Independent N-AC ”. In Independent N-
AC, both critics and actors are decentralized. Note that even
though this algorithm handles action explosion, decentraliz-
ing critics induces non-stationarity to the learning process for
each of the agents. Finally, we also propose an actor-critic
algorithm that employs “centralized learning and decentral-
ized execution” where there is a single policy and penalty
critic and multiple policy actors, and refer to this algorithm
as “Centralized N-AC”.
3.1 JAL N-AC
JAL N-AC employs centralized critics and centralized actors
for all the agents. The centralized policy actor computes the
joint policy of all the agents in the game. Therefore, the ac-
tion space of the centralized policy actor is the cartesian prod-
uct of action spaces of all the agents in the game.
We will now describe the JAL N-AC algorithm. Let us de-
note the current sample of the game at time t by the tuple
(Xt, at, Xt+1, Ct, {P1t , . . . , PKt}), where Xt is the current
state, at is the joint action taken by the central policy actor,
Xt+1 is the next state, Ct is the single-stage cost obtained
from the environment, and {P1t , . . . , PKt} are K single-
stage penalty costs. Let θc, θpi and θpj , j ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
correspond to the parameters of the policy critic, policy actor
and penalty critic respectively. Policy critic parameters θc are
updated by minimizing the loss function [Mnih et al., 2015],
L(θc) = (rt + γVθc(Xt+1)− Vθc(Xt))2, (12)
where rt is the modified single-stage cost given by rt =
C(Xt, at, Xt+1) +
∑K
j=1 λjPjt(Xt, at, Xt+1 and Vθc(·) de-
notes the value function approximated by the policy critic.
Having found the parameters θc of the policy critic, we uti-
lize it to compute policy gradients for improving the policy
parameters θpi of the actor. There are many ways to esti-
mate the gradient for improving the actor parameters [Sutton
and Barto, 1998]. We utilize the popular temporal difference
learning (TD(0)) update with baseline. We update the policy
parameters θpi as follows:
θpi := θpi − a(t)(rt + γVθc(Xt+1)− Vθc(Xt))
∇θpi log pi(at|Xt)), (13)
where Vθc(Xt) is the baseline. Note that in (13) the baseline
is subtracted from the value function estimate to reduce the
variance of the gradient estimate.
The penalty critic estimates the penalty value function pa-
rameters θpj , j ∈ 1, . . . ,K. These parameters are computed
by minimizing the loss function L(θpj ) defined as
L(θpj ) = (Pj(Xt, at, Xt+1)+γVθpj (Xt+1)− Vθpj (Xt))2,
where Vθpj (Xt) (resp. Vθpj (Xt+1)) is the value function
associated with the penalty constraint j for state Xt (resp.
Xt+1).
Finally, the Lagrange parameters are improved by the
penalty actor by performing stochastic gradient ascent as fol-
lows (see [Borkar, 2005; Bhatnagar, 2010]):
λjt+1 = max(0, λjt + b(t)(Vθpj (Xt)− αj)), (14)
where b(t) is the step-size parameter and λjt is the Lagrange
parameter corresponding to penalty function i at time t. The
maximum operation is done to ensure that the Lagrange pa-
rameters stay always positive. The update in (13) is per-
formed on a faster time scale while the update in (14) is per-
formed on a slower timescale [Borkar, 2005].
3.2 Independent N-AC
In this algorithm, each agent has its own nested actor-critic
architecture, i.e., there are a total of n nested actor-critic ar-
chitectures. Each agent learns parameters separately for its
nested actor-critic architecture and estimates its individual
policy pii, i.e., each agent maintains its own policy actor-critic
and penalty actor-critic networks. At every step of training,
each agent takes actions based on its current policy indepen-
dent of other agents policies and receives common cost from
the environment. Using this cost signal, all the agents inde-
pendently improve their policy and penalty parameters. Each
agent manages its nested actor-critic architecture in the same
manner as described in the JAL N-AC algorithm. Indepen-
dent N-AC suffers from the problem of non-stationarity as
past learning of an agent may become obsolete as other agents
simultaneously explore actions during their training phase.
Therefore the individual policies obtained by the agents may
not be optimal. Nonetheless this is a simple algorithm that
avoids action explosion and has been seen to perform well in
some scenarios [Tampuu et al., 2017].
3.3 Centralized N-AC
This algorithm imbibes advantages of the two algorithms de-
scribed above. During training, learning is centralized here in
the sense that value function is estimated based on the joint
actions of all agents while policies for all agents are decen-
tralized. There is one centralized critic (policy critic) for es-
timating the value function of the single state cost (i.e., the
Lagrangian), another centralized critic (penalty critic) for es-
timating the value function of the penalty cost (for improving
the Lagrange parameters) and n actors estimating the policies
of each of the agents. Finally, there is a penalty actor im-
proving the Lagrange multipliers. After learning is complete,
agents execute learnt policies independently. This idea is well
studied in the unconstrained multi-agent case in [Foerster et
al., 2017a; Lowe et al., 2017]. The algorithmic description
of Centralized N-AC for solving the fully cooperative multi-
agent constrained RL problem is provided in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1. In our algorithms, policy actor-critic determines
the optimal policy by minimizing the Lagrangian for a given
λ. On the other hand, the penalty actor-critic updates the
Lagrange multipliers by evaluating the policy on the penalty
cost functions. As these two computations have to be carried
ad infinitum, the idea of two time-scale stochastic approxima-
tions [Borkar, 1997] has been utilized to interleave these two
operations for ensuring the desired convergence behaviour.
4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we evaluate and analyze our algorithms on
three constrained muti-agent tasks. We begin with two simple
games namely constrained grid world and constrained coin
game that have discrete state spaces. We then discuss our
results on a complex environment - constrained cooperative
navigation that has continuous state space.
4.1 Constrained Grid World
In the constrained grid world, the objective of each agent is
to learn the shortest path from a given source to the target
with at most α overlap in the path with other agents. For our
setting, we consider a grid of size 4× 4 with two agents. The
state of each agent si, i ∈ 1, 2 is a vector of size 16 with
value 1 at the current position of the agent i and value 0 at all
other positions. The permissible actions for agents in the grid
include moving up, down, left and right wherever applicable.
The game ends when both the agents reach the target state
11 or the number of steps in the game exceeds 10. Note that
when an agent reaches the target state, it remains in the target
state till the end of the episode. In the constrained setting
that we consider, a single-stage penalty of +1 is imposed on
the agents if they enter the same block in the grid and we
prescribe a penalty threshold of α. For example, if we let α to
be 0, then we are imposing the constraint that the agents have
Algorithm 1 Centralized N-AC
1: State sample at time t: Xt = (X1t , ...X
i
t) where X
i
t is
the state of the agent i.
2: for agents i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3: ai = Sample an action from pii(· | Xit)
4: end for
5: Obtain cost, penalties and next state from the environ-
ment.
(Ct, Pjt , Xt+1)←− get reward(Xt, a1, ...an)
6: Let rt = Ct +
∑K
j=1 λjtPjt .
7: Train policy critic parameters θc to minimize the loss
function (rt + γVθc(Xt+1)− Vθc(Xt))2
8: for j = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
9: Train penalty critic parameters θpj to minimize the
loss function (Pjt + γVθpj (Xt+1)− Vθpj (Xt))2
10: end for
11: for agents i = 1, . . . , n do
12: Improve policy actor i’s policy parameter θpii by per-
forming gradient descent along the estimated gradient
(rt + γVθc(Xt+1)− Vθc(Xt))∇θpii log pii(ai | Xit)
13: end for
14: Finally update the Lagrange parameters in the penalty ac-
tor as λt+1 = max(0, λt + b(t)(Vθp(Xt) − α)) where
α = (α1, . . . , αK) is the vector of prescribed thresholds.
to reach the target state from every source state in minimum
number of steps without any overlap in their paths.
12 13 14 15
8 9 10 11
4 5 6 7
0 1 2 3
Table 1: Grid World
In this experiment, we train all three algorithms for 10, 000
episodes starting from random start positions and three dif-
ferent α values 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 respectively. We perform 10
independent runs of the experiment and report the median
of the expected penalty obtained across 10 runs. Note that
the expected penalty is computed by averaging total penalty
obtained by following the converged policy over 10, 000 test
episodes. We observe that in all the three algorithms, agents
reach the target state from any given start state in at most 10
steps. The performance of our algorithms in meeting the con-
straints is given in Table 2 and we find that all algorithms
nearly meet the penalty constraints.
We now briefly discuss how the agents learn the shortest
path to reach the target state while meeting the penalty con-
straints. For example, two agents starting from state 0 learn
to take the following paths to reach 11, the target state.
Agent1 : 0− 4− 8− 9− 10− 11
and
Agent2 : 0− 1− 2− 6− 7− 11.
Algorithm
Expected
Penalty
(α = 0.1)
Expected
Penalty
(α = 0.3)
Expected
Penalty
(α = 0.5)
JAL
N-AC 0.092 0.250 0.444
Independent
N-AC 0.127 0.221 0.346
Centralised
N-AC 0.064 0.217 0.405
Table 2: Expected penalty obtained by the converged policy for dif-
ferent values of penalty threshold in constrained grid world
Algorithm
Expected
Total Cost
α = 0.1
Expected
Total Cost
α = 0.3
Expected
Total Cost
α = 0.5
JAL
N-AC 2.4149 2.1837 2.1831
Independent
N-AC 1.8144 1.6276 1.5594
Centralised
N-AC 2.1457 1.7104 1.5607
Table 3: Expected total cost of the converged policy in the con-
strained grid world for different thresholds
On the other hand, for the initial state 3, both the agents learn
to follow the same path:
3− 7− 11.
In the first case (start state 0), agents took disjoint paths to
reach the target state in the least number of steps. In the sec-
ond case (start state 3), however, if one of the agents takes a
detour from the shortest route to reach the target state, then
it considerably increases the objective of the game. Hence,
they learn to take the same shortest route violating the con-
straint minimally when required. Note that average overlap
is 1 when we start from state 3 however as the initial state is
chosen with probability 1/16, the average overlap is 0.06.
In Table 3, we present the median of the expected cost for
three distinct values of α = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 obtained by our al-
gorithms. Note that the expected cost in this experiment is the
average number of steps taken by the algorithm to reach the
target state from random start positions. The expected cost
monotonically decreases with increase in α. This is the de-
sired behaviour as the constraint becomes less tighter when α
increases and is seen to be the case in all our algorithms.
4.2 Constrained Coin Game
In the coin game considered in [Foerster et al., 2018], the
objective of the agents is to collect the coin that appear at
random positions in the given grid. In the constrained version,
multiple agents exist and each agent can only collect specific
type of coin. The objective is to maximize the total coins
collected by the agents. We consider two agents ‘blue’ and
‘red’ in a 3× 3 grid. The coin can be in one of the two colors
- blue or red. We impose a penalty on the agents if the color of
the agent doesn’t match with the color of the coin collected.
For example, if the agent ’blue’ collects a ’red’ coin, a penalty
of +1 is incurred by both the agents. The state of the game is a
4×3×3 matrix that encodes the positions of the agents in the
grid and also positions of the coins (blue and red) [Foerster
et al., 2018]. Note that unlike in the grid world game, both
agents have access to full state information. The actions of
agents similar to the grid world setting include moving up,
down, left and right wherever applicable.
Algorithm Expected Penalty
α = 0.2
JAL N-AC 0.110
Independent N-AC 0.211
Centralized N-AC 0.208
Table 4: Performance of converged policy in meeting the constraints
in the constrained coin game
We evaluate the performance of the converged policy
across 10 runs and report the median of the expected penalty
in Table 4. We observe that all three algorithms nearly meet
the penalty threshold value α = 0.2.
4.3 Constrained Cooperative Navigation
This is the constrained version of the cooperative navigation
game proposed in [Lowe et al., 2017; Mordatch and Abbeel,
2017]. The objective of the agents in this game is to move to-
wards the landmarks that are located on a continuous space.
Note that this game despite having similarity to constrained
grid world has continuous state space unlike the finite state
space in the grid world. As we have uncountable number of
states in this game, non-linear function approximators for es-
timating the cost and penalty value functions play a crucial
role in obtaining good policy. The positions of the agents and
landmarks change dynamically over different episodes. The
agents have to learn a policy that minimizes the number of
steps to reach the landmark with constraint on the number of
collisions between the agents. For each landmark, the Eu-
clidean distance to the closest agent is calculated and sum of
the distances is provided as the common cost to the agents.
Each agent incurs a penalty of +1 for colliding with each
other.
Figure 2: Performance of algorithms in reducing the objective func-
tion as the learning progresses
Figure 3: Performance of algorithms in meeting the constraint as the
learning progresses
Algorithm
Expected
Total Cost
α = 0.1
Expected
Penalty
α = 0.1
JAL N-AC 18.5826 0.0442
Independent N-AC 22.9310 0.0338
Centralized N-AC 17.9201 0.1324
Table 5: Performance of converged policy in constrained coopera-
tive navigation
In this experiment, we have two agents in the game. The
agent is said to reach the landmark if the total Euclidean dis-
tance cost is less than 2 units. The game also ends if agents do
not reach the landmark in maximum of 30 time steps. We set
the penalty constraint to α = 0.1. We train our algorithm on a
single run for 5×104 iterations. From Figures 2 and 3, we see
that the expected total cost and expected penalty decreases as
learning progresses. Finally, in Table 5, we observe that all
our algorithms yield converged policies that nearly satisfy the
penalty constraints.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have considered the problem of finding
near-optimal policies satisfying specified constraints for the
multi-agent fully cooperative stochastic game setting. Our
algorithms utilize nested actor-critic architectures to enforce
agents to meet the penalty constraints. Utilizing this archi-
tecture, we presented three multi-agent RL methods namely
JAL N-AC, Independent N-AC and Centralized N-AC each
of which utilize non-linear function approximators for value
function estimations. Finally, we empirically showed the per-
formance of our algorithms on three multi-agent tasks.
An interesting future direction would be to extend the pro-
posed actor-critic algorithms to other constrained stochastic
games involving say fully competitive and mixed (coopera-
tive and competitive) settings. Another line of research would
be to develop algorithms for agents with continuous action
spaces. Further, we would like to deploy our algorithms
on real world applications such as cooperative surveillance
through multiple drones and smart power grid settings with
constraints.
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